Research

My master’s thesis at CLCERT, Universidad de Chile, and additional training in cybersecurity.

Master’s thesis

Secure publication of aggregate statistics in verifiable electronic voting

My thesis designs a cryptographic mechanism to publish statistics of a verifiable electronic vote without compromising ballot secrecy.

Institution
CLCERT, Universidad de Chile
Advisors
Alejandro Hevia, Camilo Gómez
Status
Submitted and under review. Defense expected between December 2026 and February 2027.
Year
2026

Thesis for the M.Sc. in Computer Science (Magíster en Ciencias, mención Computación) at Universidad de Chile. Under the double degree program, the same thesis also completes my Computer Engineering degree.

The problem

In a verifiable electronic vote, each voter can check that their ballot was counted as cast, and anyone can check that the result matches the recorded ballots. All of this without anyone learning how each person voted.

Beyond the total, an organization often wants to publish statistics: how each group voted, for example each school, or students, academics and staff separately. That is where the risk appears. If three people voted in a group and all three chose the same option, the group’s result reveals each of their votes. Crossing two labels that look harmless on their own can produce groups that small, and a very lopsided result allows strong inferences even when the group is not that small.

Why it has to be verifiable

A simple way out is to let the election authority review the data in private and decide what to publish. But then everyone has to trust it: nobody else can check that those statistics come from the ballots actually cast. A verifiable vote exists precisely to avoid depending on that trust, and the statistics published with it should follow the same rule.

What the thesis aims for

A cryptographic mechanism to publish statistics of a verifiable electronic vote without compromising ballot secrecy, so the statistics stay useful and can be verified just like the result. The context is UParticipa, a verifiable electronic voting system.

I will publish the text after the defense.

Training

CiberLAC 2026 Cybersecurity School

I was one of three CLCERT students selected to represent Universidad de Chile at this 65-hour school.

Institution
IDB and Red CiberLAC
Status
Completed, with a 65-hour certificate.
Year
2026

An international, in-person and intensive cybersecurity school, held from August 5 to 14, 2026, in Florianópolis, Brazil. It was organized by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Red CiberLAC, the Latin American and Caribbean network of excellence in cybersecurity.

Courses

  • MITRE ATT&CK: modeling adversary tactics and techniques.
  • Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) adoption: criteria to prepare the migration.
  • Blockchain fundamentals: technical foundations and use cases.
  • Information asset management with free software.

Practice

CTF Tectonic, a capture the flag competition. There were also workshops and talks on incident response, personal data protection in research, critical infrastructure in Latin America, digital forensics and social engineering.

What I most want to follow up on from the school is the migration to post-quantum cryptography and blockchain, because both are close to my thesis.